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In Search of Equality for Women:
From Suffrage to Civil Rights
Nan D. Hunter*
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes women’s rights advocacy and its impact on
evolutions in the meaning of gender equality during the period from
the achievement of suffrage in 1920 until the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The primary lesson is that one cannot separate the conceptualiza-
tion of equality or the jurisprudential philosophy underlying it from
the dynamics and characteristics of the social movements that ac-
tively give it life. Social movements identify the institutions and
practices that will be challenged, which in turn determines which
doctrinal issues will provide the raw material for jurisgenerative
change. Without understanding a movement’s strategy and oppor-
tunities for action, one cannot know why law developed as it did.
This article also demonstrates that this phase of women’s rights
advocacy comprised not one movement—as it is usually described—
but three: the suffragists who turned to a campaign for an Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) after winning the Nineteenth Amend-
ment; the organizations inside and outside the labor movement that
prioritized the wellbeing of women workers in the industrial econ-
omy; and the birth control movement. All three branches engaged
with courts, legislatures, and other lawmakers, using a variety of
methods and a mixture of complementary and contradictory argu-
ments in an effort to secure full citizenship status for women in the
political, economic, and family realms.
Different approaches to equality, however, created a significant
movement disability. Prioritizing the ERA cemented that branch’s
allegiance to what would now be called formal equality, the princi-
ple that men and women should be held to the same rights and du-
ties under law. This absolute equality stance precluded support for
laws setting protective working standards only for women, the par-
amount goal of those most concerned with women working in
* Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author
expresses her appreciation to the organizers of the 2020 AALS Conference Symposium on
the Nineteenth Amendment for their selection of this paper as one of the presentations and
to the editors of the Duquesne Law Review.
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factories. ERA advocates saw protective laws as Trojan horses that
promised minimum wages and a cap on hours but also disqualified
women from some of the highest-paying jobs. Labor activists saw
the disabilities associated with women’s political and family status
as problematic, but secondary to economic issues. Birth control ad-
vocates developed arguments that sidestepped the frame of equality
altogether.
The absence of a united position on the scope of gender equality
under the law facilitated the silence of the Supreme Court, which
perpetuated a discourse of domesticity with respect to the legal sta-
tus of women that began before suffrage and continued long after.
The gap in constitutional law as to gender not only stymied doctri-
nal development but also deprived women’s rights advocates of the
cultural power that attaches to an overarching equality narrative.
Yet although the discourse of law drove the branches of women’s
rights advocacy apart, it also provided a venue in which equality
had to be, and ultimately could be, defined, at least for regulatory
purposes.
It was the labor-oriented portion of the movement that brought
an anti-discrimination model into women’s rights advocacy. De-
mands for equal pay combined the no-differential-treatment ap-
proach of the ERA wing with the workplace-only focus of the labor
movement. This linkage ironically brought the women workers
groups substantively closer to the anti-classification position asso-
ciated with the equality/sameness understanding advocated by sup-
porters of the ERA. The institutional mechanism that instantiated
this melding was a presidential commission that produced a report
which appeared destined for the shelves of the bureaucracy. Be-
neath the surface, however, the commission served the function of
aggregating and integrating women’s rights advocacy across all
three movement branches.
The conventional understanding that feminism was dormant be-
tween adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment and the eruption of
rights claims in the 1960s is wrong. Examining the campaigns for
legal change across the branches of the movement during this time
reveal an increase, not a diminution, in demands for full and equal
citizenship in multiple arenas. What was dormant was the devel-
opment of the concept of gender equality in constitutional law, but
that was not for lack of activity by women on the ground.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the National Organization for Women (NOW) declared
in its Founding Principles that it sought to fill a yawning political
gap: “[t]here is no civil rights movement to speak for women, as
there has been for Negroes and other victims of discrimination.”1
The implicit message that there was no comprehensive social move-
ment focused on equality under law for women was both right and
wrong. It was wrong because, by 1966, decades of work by multiple
organizations that were feminist in function, if not always in name,
had produced not just the Nineteenth Amendment’s promise of suf-
frage,2 but also social insurance programs that partially
1. Betty Friedan, The National Organization for Women’s 1966 Statement of Purpose,
NAT’LORG.WOMEN, https://now.org/about/history/statement-of-purpose/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2020).
2. I use the term “promise” to reflect the reality that only white women and Black
women outside the South received the benefits of the Nineteenth Amendment. In the re-
mainder of this article, I sometimes use “women” when the proper referent would be “white
women.” Rather than seek to specify differential consequences for each instance, I make note
here that the organizations, strategies, and concepts of law discussed throughout were per-
vasively racialized. Foundationally, the Nineteenth Amendment itself had little impact on
Black women in southern states who were disenfranchised by Jim Crow laws in 1920 and
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compensated for gendered economic structures, nationwide access
to birth control, and Congressional enactment of two anti-discrimi-
nation statutes. NOW was right, though, that there had not been
a successful litigation campaign framed in terms of women’s rights
of the kind that the NAACP had brought to the campaign for racial
justice.
The desire by NOW’s founders to mimic the role of the NAACP,
and especially its Legal Defense Fund, reinforced the belief during
the 1960s that creating new law, especially in and through the pro-
cess of Supreme Court rulings, constituted the most effective strat-
egy to achieve equality. By that measure, women’s rights advocacy
was indeed several steps behind efforts to end discrimination based
on race. And the path suggested by NOW proved to be essential.
Politically and doctrinally, feminist arguments succeeded only after
they built directly on the analogy to race. The civil rights move-
ment—a phrase generally used as synonymous with seeking to se-
cure racial equality—has provided the dominant narrative for all
American social movements for equality.
As a result, most legal scholarship on law and social movements
has taken race-oriented efforts as the starting point for the field.3
The early conventional wisdom was that these campaigns were cen-
tered on litigation, a strategy later imitated by many movements.4
More recently, the literature has stressed that reliance on litigation
renders social movements susceptible to the multiple flaws that
come from assuming that the courts can produce significant reallo-
cation of power relations or reworking of structural practices.5
remained so for many years thereafter. Nan D. Hunter, Reconstructing Liberty, Equality,
and Marriage: The Missing Nineteenth Amendment Argument, 19TH AMEND. ED. GEO. L.J.
73, 75 n.3 (2020). Their inability to benefit from the Amendment was well known at the time.
See Elsie Hill & Florence Kelley, Shall Women Be Equal Before the Law?, NATION (Apr. 12,
1922), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/shall-women-be-equal-law/ (“Today mil-
lions of American women . . . are kept from the polls in bold defiance of the Suffrage Amend-
ment.”). In the effort to win ratification by the necessary number of states, suffragists vacil-
lated repeatedly over how much to accommodate the white political leadership in southern
states. See generally AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THEWOMAN SUFFRAGEMOVEMENT
1890 1920, at 163 218 (1965).
3. Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439–41 (1984); Robert L.
Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN L. REV. 207,
208 (1976). As Houck notes, free legal aid for persons who could not afford lawyers also began
in this period; however, I am examining only cause-oriented organizations.
4. Rabin, supra note 3, at 215. The history of the NAACP, which relied on litigation to
a greater extent than the other rights groups, provides some justification for this approach.
Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the
ACLU Turned to Courts, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 375–76 (2020). The ACLU and other
groups followed suit. Id. at 380–81, 390.
5. Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV.
2027, 2037, 2043–47 (2008).
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This article analyzes the dynamics of law and social changemove-
ments from a different perspective: the role of legal advocacy in
women’s rights campaigns from the cusp of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. We still tend
to think of legal equality for women as beginning with the suffrage
campaign, culminating in adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment
in 1920, and followed by an effort to enact the Equal Rights Amend-
ment that withered into obscurity until its rebirth in the 1970s.6
The lens that I use in this article brings into focus three distinct
movements or movement branches that dominated the fifty-year in-
terim and utilized new concepts of women’s equality and a wide
range of methods—inside and outside courts—to achieve it.
In those first years after suffrage, three powerful movements
formed that were organized explicitly or implicitly around gender
and the role of law in gender formation: the Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA) campaign, the campaign for women workers’ rights,
and the birth control campaign. All were efforts self-consciously
directed at enhancing women’s power in society, in varying con-
texts. In each, the associated legal change efforts highlighted the
life conditions of women, even if the terminology of equality was not
used.
Methodologically, except for the birth control movement,
women’s rights advocates during this period largely avoided litiga-
tion, having learned that lawsuits produced fights that they could
not win. In court, they faced a discourse of domesticity that reigned
in constitutional law until the 1970s. Viewed from today’s perspec-
tive, in which society uses the extent of legal equality to measure a
civil rights movement’s success, the result is a blank space for
women in the history of equal protection law until the 1970s.7 The
absence of successful litigation challenges under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause created a lacuna for women’s rights not just in equal
protection doctrine but also in the broader concept of equality. The
greatest significance of the litigation gap was the absence of the le-
gitimating effects of judicial text, not the absence of that particular
method of change. The third branch of women’s rights—the birth
control movement—initially sought to end the double standard be-
tween men and women with regard to the prerogatives and respon-
sibilities for sexual behavior, but soon based its legal arguments on
free expression and deference to medical authority.
6. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHYWE LOST THE ERA 17 18 (1986).
7. Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family,
129 YALE L.J.F. 450, 454, 479 (2020); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amend-
ment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 953 56 (2002).
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The division of women’s rights advocacy into three branches re-
flected the failure to develop a shared understanding of their goal.
The political and economic branches bitterly and publicly disagreed
about what equality for women meant. Potentially, there could
have been a positive side to the divisiveness: the inability to settle
on a definition left space for the concept of equality to evolve, de-
velop new meanings, and emerge from jurisgenerative venues other
than the courts. In the venue of state legislatures, on an issue other
than the struggle between labor and management, there was a
glimmer of greater flexibility and intra-movement accommodation.
For the most part, however, feminists surmounted these divisions
only much later by adopting the paradigm of civil rights, a resolu-
tion that continues to beg the question of whether equality is syn-
onymous with full political, economic, and sexual rights or only with
a much more limited claim against discrimination.
The complexities of gender equality predate even the right to
vote. Beginning with the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments
in 1848, the goal of ending coverture—which sounded in a frame of
collective liberty more than equality—carried as much importance
as securing the vote.8 The two goals were inextricably linked, at
the superficial level because married women were thought to be al-
ready represented through the votes of their husbands who were
understood to hold dominion over households, and at a deeper level,
because coverture was the enforcement arm of a legal system that
accorded marriage the status of quasi-sovereignty in its jurisdic-
tional authority over women. Subordination within the family was
both the predicate for and product of political subordination. The
legal and social insulation of family governance undercut efforts to
apply the constitutional norms of equality or liberty.
After the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, women still
faced a matrix of oppressive institutions (somewhat relaxed but
continuing) that was anchored in the state, the family, and the
economy. Black women struggled in addition with exclusion from
all public and private spaces marked as white, not least among
them large parts of the women’s rights movement itself.9 Divided
not only by race but also by economic status and ideological
8. Hunter, supra note 2, at 90 92, 95 96; Tracy A. Thomas, More Than the Vote: The
Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 349, 350 51
(2020).
9. See generally Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Clubwomen and Electoral Politics in the
1920s, in AFRICAN-AMERICANWOMEN AND THE VOTE, 1837–1965 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997);
see also SUZANNEM. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820 1920, at 178 (1996); PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORPHAN: GENDER EQUALITY AND THENINETEENTH AMENDMENT 53–55 (2020).
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priorities, women undertook multiple, sometimes contradictory,
campaigns to change the law of marriage, of economic structures,
and of state regulation of sexuality.
Notwithstanding the combined scope of these campaigns,
women’s rights advocates failed to develop an analysis that ad-
dressed the interlocking nature of the domestic and economic as-
pects of women’s citizenship. The three components of women’s
rights advocacy developed on different tracks, producing different
understandings of equality, leading to a failure for several decades
to develop a coherent theory of equality or a strategy that addressed
the inseparability of family and work life. The result was a gap—
intellectually, legally, and theoretically—at heart of the effort.
This intra-movement impasse ended with the adoption by
women’s advocates, led by Pauli Murray in the early 1960s, of what
I will call the civil rights paradigm, i.e., the anti-discrimination
model for laws prohibiting race discrimination.10 The largely for-
gotten President’s Commission on the Status of Women in 1961 to
1963 served as the institutional venue for the work by Murray and
others that led to the inclusion of “sex” in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The civil rights paradigm was an imperfect fit for gender subordi-
nation, but it provided a workable compromise position for both
ERA advocates and labor union women, who had developed a deep
enmity in the course of battles over protective labor laws.
This article takes as its starting point that it has become part of
American political culture that persons who seek justice do so in
significant part by pursuing rights. Law is a strategy; litigation is
one tactic. Participants in movements identify goals and select tar-
get institutions subject to a variety of internal and external pres-
sures—the available resources; the preferences of funders, mem-
bers and staff; the need to enhance the organization’s status vis-à-
vis rival groups in the same struggle; the state of the substantive
law; and the ideological complexion of courts and legislatures. At
bottom, political strategy guides the selection of institutions to be
challenged, which, in turn, determines which doctrinal issues will
provide the raw material for jurisgenerative change.
The legal system is not merely a passive venue, however. Legal
discourse, understood as this is an ongoing process, translates and
frames ideas in ways that can change social meanings and struc-
tural relationships. New interpretations of collective experience
align with popular understandings of law. Meanings evolve as they
10. CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES,
1945 1968, at 126 30 (1988). See generally SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE:
FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011).
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are (re)produced in and through social relationships, practices, in-
stitutions, and knowledges. In the course of that evolution, new
political explanations emerge, which then produce new meanings,
in an iterative process.
This article contributes to the scholarship both on law and social
change and on gender equality. It is the first to link the history of
the three branches of the early twentieth century women’s move-
ment by analyzing how each used law as a key ideological and stra-
tegic resource. This approach yields several insights.
First, divisions in the struggle to define gender equality, both in
popular discourse and in legal terms, led to multiple, competing un-
derstandings of what that concept meant. Groups focused on elim-
inating discriminatory laws, especially with respect to families,
pursued the goal of equal treatment as subjects of the state. Groups
concerned with the special harshness of women’s working condi-
tions sought ameliorative steps that could be justified legally on ne-
cessity rather than equality grounds. The birth control branch of
the movement sidestepped equality arguments, and perhaps be-
cause of that, had the greatest success in litigation.
These arguments forestalled the capacity to build coalitions,
even—and perhaps especially—among women’s groups. The excep-
tion came in the context of state-level legislative work, where cross-
organizational collaboration occurred more frequently, likely be-
cause of the lower visibility of geographically dispersed state cam-
paigns and the more pragmatic, adaptive nature of legislative lob-
bying compared to litigation. Regardless, women’s rights advocates
were left without a master frame or even a coherent argument for
gender equality.
Second, the turn of the century—roughly coincident with the
Nineteenth Amendment—was the period when law-focused organ-
izational efforts for social change began. During the Progressive
era, in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments and as legal
formalism declined, the major institutional bases for civil rights
lawyering were founded. Organized and strategic constitutional lit-
igation became a social movement tool. Each of the three branches
of the women’s rights movement had its own distinct relationship
to and experience with litigation, and their continuing reliance on
legislation, direct action, and public education illustrates that to-
day’s focus on alternatives to litigation is not new.
Third, when one does narrow the focus to litigation, legal realism
emerges as a dominant factor both for the substantive content and
the tactical innovations in women’s rights law. This effect contin-
ues throughout the period before World War II and provides an
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important linkage between legal realism and the legal liberalism
associated with postwar civil rights campaigns. Ironically, the
model for anti-discrimination law as applied to women, often criti-
cized for its grounding in notions of formal equality now considered
conservative, grew out of the branch of the movement most closely
associated with the political left and the rights of women in the
workforce.
Throughout, the article demonstrates that one cannot separate
the conceptualization of equality or the jurisprudential philosophy
undergirding it from the dynamics and characteristics of the social
movements that actively give it life.
II. DÉBUT DE SIÈCLE
“[This] is the first hour in history for the women of the world.
This is the woman’s age!”11
Millions of American women had become engaged in political ad-
vocacy by the time that the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted in
1920. Although it secured the vote for many women, the Amend-
ment lagged the front edge of a surge of social change at the begin-
ning of the century that was driven by Progressive era reform, an
urbanizing economy and culture, and an unprecedented level of
women’s activism.12 At the same time, by its formalization of full
citizenship status for women independent of husbands and outside
the structure of the family, the Amendment also outpaced norms
that still held sway in many parts of the country. For millions of
women, the realities of life had not caught up to the opportunities
that they could imagine or read about. The racial justice and labor
movements also expanded during this period, albeit often in the
face of violent opposition. One product of the disjuncture between
the traditional structures and practices perpetuated by the legal
system and the pressures for progressive change was the birth of
social movement lawyering.
11. J. STANLEY LEMONS, THE WOMAN CITIZEN: SOCIAL FEMINISM IN THE 1920S, at 20
(1973) (quoting the President of the National Women’s Trade Union League in an address to
the organization’s biennial convention in 1917).
12. Women during this era were, if anything, “overorganized.” Nancy F. Cott, Across the
Great Divide: Women in Politics Before and After 1920, in WOMEN, POLITICS AND CHANGE
153, 161 (Louise A. Tilly & Patricia Gurin eds., 1990) (quoting Inez Haynes Irwin, author
and former National Woman’s Party suffragist). The inter-war period was the time of
women’s greatest level of involvement in various reform efforts. NANCY F. COTT, THE
GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 97 (1987); see also LEMONS, supra note 11, at 41 58;
NANCYWOLOCH, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 382 416 (1984).
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A. The Iron Triangle of Gender
Socially and legally, women have long faced an exit/entry trap
with respect to marriage and economic independence. Divorce was
rarely attainable in the nineteenth century, and while opportuni-
ties for higher education and paid employment increased, the best
paths for mobility remained closed to women.13 From its inception,
the suffrage movement sought three goals alongside the vote, each
of which would open new economic and social possibilities for
women as well as reform the law: to democratize marriage, to liber-
alize divorce, and to improve access for women to paid employment.
Today, we think of these as equality goals, but to be historically
accurate, they first arose in a discourse of emancipation.14
Prior to the Civil War, women’s rights and abolition advocates
were often closely linked.15 After the war, in debates over the Re-
construction Amendments, Congress refused to consider women as
a group for whom it was necessary or appropriate to guarantee
equality in the incidents of citizenship.16 At the heart of congres-
sional debates were fundamental questions of personhood and
equality. White women were gendered as property under the law
of coverture but raced as fully human, although unequal. For Black
Americans, both legal personhood and equality were at stake. Con-
gress extended minimal constitutional personhood to formerly en-
slaved persons through the Thirteenth Amendment and its embed-
ded repudiation of the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision.17 The
issue of constitutional equality for Black Americans became focused
most sharply on the right to vote, resulting in the last in the series
of Reconstruction Amendments—the Fifteenth, adopted in 1870—
which guaranteed suffrage regardless of race.
Achieving the vote thus became the dominant framework after
the Civil War for understanding equality of citizenship more gener-
ally. The Fifteenth Amendment reflected and embodied the belief
that voting and political equality mutually defined each other. In
response, women who had previously been focused on ending the
regime of coverture as much as on suffrage began to prioritize
13. WOLOCH, supra note 12, at 221, 276.
14. Hunter, supra note 2, at 86 89.
15. ELLEN CAROLDUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE&WOMEN’S RIGHTS 65 (1998).
16. Id. at 90 94; MARILLEY, supra note 9, at 66 76; Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender
Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (1994).
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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achieving the vote as the path to what was understood to represent
equal political status and full (that is, voting) citizenship.18
The most promising constitutional basis for securing political
rights for women initially appeared to be Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which nationalized the concepts of equal pro-
tection of the law and the benefits of citizenship without an explicit
limiting reference to race as the basis for coverage. In 1875, how-
ever, the Supreme Court ruled that voting was not among the priv-
ileges and immunities of federal citizenship, thus leaving women’s
access to the vote based on sex up to states.19 And in 1880, the
Court made clear its view that the Fourteenth Amendment as a
whole, including the Equal Protection Clause, addressed only race
discrimination.20 In boxing women out of Fourteenth Amendment
protection, the Court invoked the de jure subordination of wives to
husbands and the “natural” role of women.21 These rulings thereby
installed an industrial age version of the feudal concept of cover-
ture.22 They conflated law and nature, creating the jurisprudential
category of woman, defined by marriage.
The Nineteenth Amendment relaxed the legal bonds of gender
and signaled the increasing social independence of women, but a
quasi-carceral matrix of subordinating institutions remained in
place. One can envision these components of the matrix as forming
an iron triangle generated by the three primary domains in which
women were fighting for freedom and equality: the state, the family,
and the economy. Each wall of the triangle connected and was se-
cured by two discursive and institutional regimes. Each dimension
of the triangle was fully and de jure determined by gender.
18. Thomas, supra note 8, at 369–70.
19. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
20. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880); see Blanche Crozier, Constitu-
tionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV. 723, 724 25 (1935).
21. Most famously, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley,
J., concurring).
22. LEOKANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THEUNFINISHED REVOLUTION 38 40 (1969).
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For women, political status, family life, and economic need were
symmetric and parallel, and the intersecting axes of the triangle
formed what amounted to a triple bind. Few women could leave a
marriage given financial dependence on husbands and the dearth
of viable job opportunities outside marriage. During marriage, the
law granted husbands an enforceable right to economic dominance.
Until the Nineteenth Amendment, women had no independent ca-
pacity as citizens to use the vote to alter these rules. Although these
dimensions of women’s lives were changing both inside and outside
the realm of legal structures, the triangle continued in law in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and its vestiges per-
sisted long afterward.
B. A New Relationship Between Social Movements and Law
At the same time that women’s rights advocates were regrouping
after their exclusion from protection under the Reconstruction
Amendments, other social justice movements were beginning to
generate planned, sustained litigation or legislation to secure or en-
force constitutional protections. These efforts were made possible
by two substantive pillars that had emerged as the basis for rights-
based arguments: the Reconstruction Amendments with regard to
race and the invocation of the First Amendment by political dissent-
ers, especially leftists engaged in labor organizing. Debates over
the Reconstruction Amendments set the stage for an explosive
growth in “[t]he idiom of rights,”23 including those framed in terms
23. LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A
NATION OF RIGHTS 125 26 (2015).
STATE
ECONOMIC FAMILYChild care
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of “equality.”24 As leftists pressed for structural change in economic
relations, they found a powerful resource in the First Amendment’s
promise (if often not a reality) of protection for speech.25
With these new or newly invigorated constitutional bases, social
movement litigation as a distinctive, organized enterprise began in
the period surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, roughly
from 1890 to 1920. Political organizations dedicated to systematic
law reform as a strategy for social change began to appear, creating
what was the first wave of coordinated social movement lawyering
in the courts. Not until the 1960s and 1970s, with the birth of mul-
tiple legal defense organizations, was there a period of similar ex-
pansion.26
The NAACP began in 1909, preceded by two smaller organiza-
tions that had sponsored litigation efforts to reinforce and expand
the protections of the Reconstruction Amendments.27 Early efforts
were led by white lawyers, some of whom were veterans of aboli-
tionist efforts.28 With the increasing education of Black lawyers, a
path broken by Charles Houston’s conversion of Howard University
School of Law into virtually a training ground for rights advocacy,
Black lawyers and other professionals took over the leadership of
the NAACP.29 The organization rapidly came to dominate the field
then known as race law.
Lawyers affiliated with the labor movement had begun fighting
anti-labor injunctions in the late 1800s.30 As protests over labor-
related issues increased, lawyers supportive of labor drove the de-
velopment of First Amendment expression law.31 The right to or-
ganize and to picket generated the core of the field.32 Some small
firms specialized in labor-side representation, and unions created
their own legal departments.
24. Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830 1930,
103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1473 (1998).
25. CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY
OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH INAMERICA 28 53 (2007); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING
FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 75 86, 122 26 (1991);
DAVIDM. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 (1997).
26. Rhode, supra note 5, at 2033.
27. SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, 1880 1915, at 58 62, 122 41, 252 66 (2013).
28. Id. at 277.
29. Steven D. Jamar, Charles Hamilton Houston (1895–1950), HOW. UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
http://law.howard.edu/brownat50/BrownBios/BioCharlesHHouston.html (2004); NAACP Le-
gal History, NAACP, https://naacp.org/naacp-legal-team/naacp-legal-history/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2020).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (upholding injunction).
31. See generally RABBAN, supra note 25.
32. Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 302,
309–10 (2014).
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The National Consumers League (NCL), which began in 1891,33
was predominantly a women’s organization in fact34 and was led,
beginning in 1899, by social justice powerhouse Florence Kelley.35
The NCL focused during this period primarily on labor issues (de-
spite its name),36 especially the concerns of women and children
who worked in factories or at home as piece workers. The NCL en-
listed Louis Brandeis to defend the constitutionality of state laws
that guaranteed women minimum wages and maximum hours.37
The result was what became known as the Brandeis brief,38 fa-
mously successful inMuller v. Oregon.39 After Muller, the political
stature of the NCL soared.40 In 1919, on the eve of suffrage, the
organization adopted an ambitious ten-year strategy for legal re-
form based on enactment of protective labor laws for women.41 Over
time, Brandeis was joined or succeeded by other elite attorneys who
represented the NCL in the effort to preserve such laws.42
Emerging from prior groups that provided support first for paci-
fists and then for workers, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) began in 1920.43 Among its earliest endeavors was advo-
cacy for the speech rights of Margaret Sanger, who launched the
American birth control movement.44 Facing legal threats in 1916,
Sanger reached out to Roger Baldwin, who later co-founded and be-
came the first director of the ACLU, whom she knew from their
shared social circle of leftists and progressives.45 This connection
forged a link between women seeking reproductive control and lead-
ers in the mobilization of legal representation for progressive
33. LANDON R. Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THENATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE,
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THENEW DEAL ERA 14 (2000).
34. Id. at 13 14, 259 61, 264 69.
35. NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN WORKERS,
1890S–1990S, at 61 62 (2015).
36. The name derived from the principle of “[e]thical consumption,” a tradition associated
with women who boycotted British goods during the Revolutionary period and slave-made
goods prior to the Civil War. STORRS, supra note 33, at 19.
37. NANCY WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 26 28
(1996).
38. I use the term Brandeis-Goldmark brief in the remainder of this article because the
massive body of empirical research for the brief was done by a team led by Josephine
Goldmark. See id. at 28 31; see also Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605.
39. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
40. WOLOCH, supra note 37, at 87.
41. Id. at 125.
42. Brandeis’s successors as legal advisors to the NCL included Felix Frankfurter, Ros-
coe Pound, Benjamin Cohen, and Dean Acheson. STORRS, supra note 33, at 37.
43. See generally RABBAN, supra note 25.
44. LEIGH ANNWHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 11 (2013).
45. Id. at 22 25.
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causes that began before the formal establishment of either the
ACLU or what became Planned Parenthood.
C. Confluence
The period encompassing the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the first quarter of the twentieth century solidified the
structural apparatus for civil rights movements. A profoundly am-
bivalent constitutional discourse of equality and free expression
emerged in the Supreme Court’s interpretations of constitutional
law during that period, inspiring a burst of new legal rights claims
but validating only some. The structural apparatus of law-focused
organizations made possible the cross-fertilization of doctrine and
strategy in at least two respects.
First, it fostered the first politically-driven formations of lawyers
in support of social justice causes. Organized legal advocacy for
constitutional rights was born during this period. The political and
cultural ascendance of equality and expression claims combined
with the new lawyer-led advocacy groups intensified the power of
law and specifically of constitutional rights claims as the primary
frame for the contestation of gendered and raced power relations
and the suppression of dissent. Lobbying of state legislators con-
tinued, as well as direct action, protests, and public education. Lit-
igation documents, such as briefs, began to be published and circu-
lated after the end of lawsuits, sometimes achieving substantial dis-
tribution.
Second, the lawyers affiliated with these organizations developed
strong professional and interpersonal ties that facilitated the mi-
gration of strategies, tactics, and doctrinal evolution across progres-
sive causes. Allying themselves with the jurisprudence of legal re-
alism, then at the height of its challenge to formalist reasoning,
these lawyers helped to channel judicial attention to “sociological
facts” generated by empirical or expert studies.46 One example of
this technique—the Brandeis-Goldmark brief—migrated from the
NCL to the ACLU to the birth control movement.
III. THREE ROADSDIVERGED
By 1920, when suffrage was achieved, the movement for women’s
rights had already fractured. During the post-Civil War period, ad-
vocacy organizations diverged into three distinct branches that
46. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Sociological Jurisprudence Past and Present, 45
LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 493 (2020).
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roughly corresponded to the iron triangle. Organizations focused
on women workers and the lines or spokes emanating from the
economy node in the triangle—the Women’s Trade Union League
(WTUL)47 and the NCL—were in place by the turn of the century.
The almost 400,000 women who had joined unions by 1920 could
vote as union members before they had a right to vote as citizens.48
The birth control movement, focused on the lines emanating from
the family node in the triangle, also began before 1920. The oldest
of the cluster—the suffrage movement—had long been focused on
the meaning of citizenship for women, at the state node of the tri-
angle. Because so many vestiges of coverture remained in place,
suffragists could declare only partial victory after winning the vote
in 1920. They redirected energy and resources toward the crusade
for a second constitutional amendment.
Each of these movements faced the challenge of defining equal-
ity.49 The conventional wisdom among historians is that the pro-
motion of so-called protective laws by organizations focused on
women workers represented the “difference” approach to women’s
equality, an assertion that women could secure equal opportunity
only if the law accommodated the family and reproductive roles that
seemed inevitable. By contrast, the former suffragists adopted
what we now call an equal treatment approach, stressing argu-
ments that women were the same as men in their political roles and
social capacities, leading to the demand for equal laws that was em-
bodied in the proposed ERA. These women, often educated and eco-
nomically secure, saw protective laws as enforcing a ceiling as much
as a floor, while working class women needed the floor more than
they feared the ceiling. Only the birth control movement avoided
the equality versus difference trap by choosing neither, and refram-
ing its rights claims on libertarian rather than egalitarian argu-
ments.
In reality, the discursive battle between the ERA-focused groups
and the worker-focused groups was even more complex than this
dichotomy suggests because both invoked both understandings of
equality for women. Their efforts illustrate concretely how the in-
determinacy of the idea of equality, and specifically of the idea of
47. The Women’s Trade Union League formed in 1903 and was “the first national body
dedicated to organizing women workers.” PHILIP S. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN
LABORMOVEMENT: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE EVE OFWORLDWAR I 120 (1979).
48. MAURINE WEINER GREENWALD, WOMEN, WAR, AND WORK: THE IMPACT OF WORLD
WAR I ONWOMENWORKERS IN THEUNITED STATES 39 (1980).
49. See generally Nancy F. Cott, Historical Perspectives: The Equal Rights Amendment
Conflict in the 1920s, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 44–59 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Kel-
ler eds., 2016).
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gender equality, shaped U.S. politics and law in the early twentieth
century. The problem was less the movement than what were un-
derstood to be the parameters of “equality.”
A. The Women’s Movement for Citizenship
What was known then as “the woman’s movement” pivoted after
suffrage was achieved. Organizations seeking suffrage disbanded,
and one—the Congressional Union—essentially reconstituted itself
the next year as the National Women’s Party (NWP), with the goal
of eliminating laws that perpetuated the residual effects of cover-
ture and restricted women in a variety of arenas. The NWP initially
hoped to convert women’s votes into support for legislative repeal
of discriminatory laws. When that voting bloc failed to materialize,
the NWP dove into an ultimately futile effort to achieve the same
result with an Equal Rights Amendment.
The ERA was designed to use the scope and power of the Suprem-
acy Clause to remove all remaining legal disabilities that applied to
women. It was of a piece with the Nineteenth Amendment, which
rectified the omission of women from the scope of the Fifteenth
Amendment by guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of sex.
The ERA’s function would have been to correct for the exclusion of
women from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by effectively
expanding the Equal Protection Clause to reach inequality based
on sex.
The ERA campaign continued the movement’s focus on state ac-
tors, political citizenship, and—because so many of the laws to be
attacked were grounded in family law—especially on the linkage
between government and family. Uniquely for women as a class,
unlike groups demarked by racial or ethnic bias or economic status,
the family was a major institutional factor in the vectors of subor-
dination.50 The post-Nineteenth Amendment effort to enact an
ERA would have, and was intended to, build on the understanding
that, to be meaningful, political citizenship had to encompass the
democratization of family and marriage.51
In their public advocacy of the ERA, NWP leaders referred almost
exclusively to family law issues, as evident in the debate-style fea-
tures on the disputes among feminists over strategy published by
50. Hunter, supra note 2, at 82, 85 86, 90 92, 95 96; Thomas, supra note 8, at 369 70;
CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE PRESENT 165 67, 175 (1980).
51. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, supra
note 7, at 473.
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popular magazines in the decade after the Nineteenth Amend-
ment.52 The pieces written by NWP spokeswomen emphasized the
imperative to eliminate state laws that privileged the authority of
husbands over the bodies, domicile, and property of wives, as well
as the father’s entitlement to legal control of children. The ERA
held the promise of achieving this goal with one effort rather than
the multiple and repeated campaigns required to change laws in
each state, thereby replacing the long state-by-state campaign to
enact Married Women’s Property Acts, an effort that had begun be-
fore the Civil War and continued after the Nineteenth Amend-
ment.53
In the first years after suffrage was won, Congress responded
positively to ameliorative legislation for women framed in different
ways. “Equal treatment” arguments prevailed in the successful
campaign by a coalition of women’s groups to enact the Cable Act
in 1922, which eliminated the disparity in the use of marital status
to determine citizenship. On a parallel track but using maternal-
istic arguments, the same coalition secured enactment and contin-
uation for several years of the Shepherd-Towner Act that provided
services to pregnant women and infants.54
Other than the legal incidents of marriage, jury service was the
issue that continued longest and most clearly bridged family law
and citizenship status after suffrage was secured. In general, states
relied on voter rolls to generate jury lists, and logic and precedent
supported the argument that once women had won equal voting
rights under the Nineteenth Amendment, they should be equally
subject to and eligible for jury service.55 Nonetheless, the mean
length of time after suffrage before states adopted equal treatment
provisions for women on juries was 21.7 years.56
The jury service effort produced both litigation and legislative
battles, which were fought by women’s rights advocates on grounds
of both equal treatment principles and the value of different per-
spectives associated with women jurors. Most campaigns were di-
rected at state legislatures. Litigation challenges arose, but most
52. See, e.g., Hill & Kelley, supra note 2; Inez Haynes Irwin, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: Why the Woman’s Party Is for It, GOODHOUSEKEEPING, Mar. 1924, at 18.
53. DEGLER, supra note 50, at 332 33.
54. COTT, THEGROUNDING OFMODERN FEMINISM, supra note 12, at 98 99.
55. Jennifer K. Brown, The Nineteenth Amendment andWomen’s Equality, 102 YALEL.J.
2175, 2183 85 (1993).
56. HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC
ADAPTATION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 192 (2012). McCammon references one movement par-
ticipant as saying that the effort to change jury service laws required something very like a
second suffrage campaign. Id. at 3.
Winter 2021 In Search of Equality 143
of those were brought by (typically male) defendants appealing a
criminal conviction, with no apparent participation by women’s
groups.
What is most noticeable about the legislative campaigns was the
willingness of advocates to blend the positions on both goals and
framing. Although they disagreed about whether to seek a jury ser-
vice only bill or a blanket ERA-style bill, the two sides did not un-
dercut each other in negotiations with state legislatures, as did
their counterparts who worked on proposals for the ERA in Con-
gress.57 They also displayed a willingness to shift back and forth
between equality and difference frames, unlike the much more te-
nacious adherence to one argument or another that characterized
disputes over protective labor laws.
Organizationally, the equal jury law advocates appear to have
operated with very little national direction.58 State chapters of the
League of Women Voters (LWV) led the effort in most places, a
group that resembled the NWP in its middle-class, essentially all-
white membership and that tended to favor an equal treatments
frame for its arguments.59 Unlike the NWP, however, it did not
prioritize the goal of ERA-style blanket bills over specific legislation
such as jury service bills. But as they operated in legislative venues
at the state level, the cluster of women’s groups involved were usu-
ally flexible on both points.
Exceptions to this pattern occurred in a handful of states when
significant tensions over goals arose within the coalition of women’s
groups. But the effect appears not to have been seriously negative;
the fine-tuning of arguments to counter the argument frames of lo-
cal opponents may have amounted to “productive conflict” that was
a net benefit to the coalition.60 And even in those states, there was
a significant period of time in which groups that prioritized differ-
ent goals collaborated.61
In the end, only one state—Wisconsin—enacted a blanket ERA-
style bill,62 but the equal treatment frame was nonetheless vali-
dated. An analysis of framing strategies used in fifteen state-level
57. The process of drafting the ERA produced months of intensive wrangling among or-
ganizations and the lawyers advising them. Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of
Equality: The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 203–22 (1991).
58. MCCAMMON, supra note 56, at 230.
59. SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN
FEMINISM BETWEEN THEWARS at 204–11 (1981).
60. MCCAMMON, supra note 56, at 227–28.
61. Id. at 79, 101–07.
62. Id. at 131–35.
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campaigns for equal jury service laws between 1911 and 1967 found
that arguments based on women’s differences from men constituted
approximately twenty-five percent of the recorded examples of
framing.63 Arguments based on the concept that women and men
should have equal rights and duties with respect to jury service
were not only more frequent but also more likely to succeed, to a
statistically significant degree, than arguments based on the theme
that women brought unique perspectives to jury service.64
The “equal treatment” frame also dominated arguments in state
courts as well as legislatures but it was rarely successful.65 In
states where advocates sought to use litigation to achieve equality
of jury service, courts unanimously ruled against them. The courts
rejected any version of an equality analysis, usually justifying their
holding with a finding of no legislative intent to include women
within the parameters of jury statutes, a narrow reading of the
Nineteenth Amendment as concerning only the vote, and the reit-
eration of the inapplicability of the Reconstruction Amendments to
questions of discrimination based on sex.66 Litigation successes oc-
curred when the issue presented was the validity of a prior legisla-
tive enactment that had extended jury responsibilities to women.67
Litigation was also pursued for secondary goals. In the handful
of jury service cases in which the NWP participated, organizational
records show that the NWP’s motivation for litigation was often
more to build publicity around the arguments that they were ad-
vancing in state legislatures than to win the case at hand.68 Their
perspicacity may have derived from personal or institutional
memory of the Reconstruction era efforts to win a right to vote un-
der a Fourteenth Amendment theory, an effort that one political
scientist described as a strategy in which litigation was used pri-
marily as a method to gain greater public visibility for suffragist
arguments.69
The point is not the absence of consistency or of philosophical pu-
rity, which in politics is probably impossible and almost certainly
at times counterproductive, but the alignment of which approach
63. Holly J. McCammon et al., Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Struc-
tures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women’s Jury Movements, 72 AM. SOCIO. REV. 725,
728 tbl. 2 (2007).
64. Id. at 740.
65. Brown, supra note 55; Richard F. Hamm, Mobilizing Legal Talent for a Cause: The
National Woman’s Party and the Campaign to Make Jury Service for Women a Federal Right,
9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y& L. 97, 117 (2001).
66. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656 (Mass. 1931).
67. MCCAMMON, supra note 56, at 61 n.5.
68. Hamm, supra note 65, at 116 17.
69. KARENO’CONNOR, WOMEN’SORGANIZATIONS’ USE OF THE COURTS 56 57 (1980).
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was more successful in which (legislative versus litigation) venue.
One reason that may help explain why the sameness/equality argu-
ment made much less progress in courts than in legislatures is the
background law on women’s family responsibilities. Courts adjudi-
cating family law disputes invoked gender as ordained by nature
and the need for “family harmony” to reject wives’ claims for inde-
pendent rights to material goods or the indicia of separate legal sta-
tus. A discourse of domesticity crowded out rights arguments, al-
lowing courts to effectively delegate authority to the family as an
intermediary lawmaking institution.
The imprimatur for domesticity flowed directly from the Supreme
Court, where it had begun in Bradwell v. Illinois70 and Minor v.
Happersett,71 and persisted for half a century.72 As late as 1961, the
U.S. Supreme Court perpetuated the domesticity rationale in hold-
ing that there was no federal constitutional barrier to exclusionary
or differential laws regarding women on juries,73 a ruling that was
not reversed until 1975.74
Initially, the difference in results between legislative and judicial
venues seems counterintuitive. One might expect that judges—es-
pecially if not elected—would be more receptive than legislators to
politically or socially disruptive arguments. But, in a moment of
changing norms, a wall of negative judicial precedent—even if not
binding—may shift the balance in the relative appeal to movement
advocates of legislative and litigation avenues. Especially when one
is seeking an under-the-radar approach, legislation offers its own
set of advantages. A key difference between the venues is intrinsic
to each institution: courts must give reasons as well as reach out-
comes. Members of legislatures can more easily hide controversial
results by alluding to collateral reasons for their actions and avoid
explicitly endorsing as radical a principle sex equality was then. In
addition, state-level legislative contests may be more manageable
because there are relatively low stakes involved. There is no doc-
trine of preclusion to prevent re-argument of issues that did not
prevail in previous years, and more personalized and informal con-
tact with both decisionmakers and opponents is the accepted norm.
The judicial discourse of domesticity proved to be strikingly resil-
ient. Equality advocates had little success in court well past the
middle of the twentieth century. In United States v. Yazell, for
70. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
71. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
72. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
73. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
74. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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example, the Supreme Court in 1966 ruled that there was no sub-
stantial national interest in the federal government adopting con-
tract enforcement principles contrary to the coverture-based state
law which was then still applicable in twelve states.75 Referring to
the “peculiarly local jurisdiction of these States”76 and the “peculi-
arly domestic” nature of the laws,77 the Court found no reason to
countermand “the subtleties reflected by the differences in the laws
of the various States which generally reflect important and care-
fully evolved state arrangements . . . .”78 Like what critical race
scholars have called “the Confederate narrative” that persisted in
law long after the Civil War,79 the discourse of domesticity ex-
pressed and helped maintain legal structures of subordination.
B. The Women’s Movement for Economic Rights
The steady growth, beginning in World War I, of women working
outside the home gave visibility and recognition to what became the
most significant branch of the women’s rights movement early in
the century. Economic citizenship issues arose in two kinds of or-
ganizations: labor unions and progressive women’s reform organi-
zations, most prominently the WTUL and the NCL.80 The focus on
workplace issues brought pressure to bear on the state-economy
nexus of the iron triangle, specifically on the options for entry into
the paid labor market and the conditions under which women
worked outside the home.
This branch of the movement prioritized the enactment of protec-
tive labor laws designed for women factory workers that set a max-
imum number of hours in the work week, a minimum hourly wage,
restrictions on night work, and regulated a variety of other condi-
tions of employment. The NCL agreed with the NWP on the need
to eliminate abuses of women tolerated by traditional family law
but argued that the NWP approach was too rigid in its insistence
on a sameness approach across the board: “Sex is a biological fact.
The political rights of citizens are not properly dependent upon sex,
but social and domestic relations and industrial activities are. . . .
Women will always need many laws different from those needed by
75. 382 U.S. 341, 351 53 (1966).
76. Id. at 353.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 353.
79. See generally Peggy Cooper Davis et al., The Persistence of the Confederate Narrative,
84 TENN. L. REV. 301 (2017).
80. WOLOCH, supra note 12, at 209.
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men.”81 At a 1921 conference called to determine the direction of
women’s rights advocacy after suffrage, the split over this issue be-
came irreparable.82 The disagreement between the ERA advocates
and the worker-centered organizations about protective labor laws
dominated women’s rights political debates until the 1960s.83
Where the NWP saw protective laws as providing incentives for
employers to hire male workers to avoid the restrictions,84 the NCL
and its allies viewed the NWP as taking the wrong side in the class
war.85 Both sides were at least partially correct. Support for the
protective legislation did often come from employers who were will-
ing to accept a floor for women’s wages so long as it was sufficiently
low, and reliably preserved a cheap source of labor for undesirable
jobs, and from male workers who understood that the protections
effectively eliminated competition by women for work that may
have been more physically demanding, but also was more highly
paid. Union support for protective laws derived from mixed mo-
tives, some supportive of women’s rights, others seeking to preserve
higher pay for men and the exclusivity of “men’s jobs.”86
Although the NCL and labor union women stressed that protec-
tive legislation was a necessary means to shield the most vulnera-
ble workers, they also lacked a coherent conceptual model of gender
equality. Unions held out the hope of providing “the greatest good
[for] the greatest number,”87 but most were led and controlled by
men with little regard for women workers, whose numbers fell far
short of half of the membership. The excesses of capitalism, or cap-
italism itself, loomed for the unions as an ideology to be fought. By
contrast, gender was seen not as an ideology but as an attribute of
nature. When confronted by ERA advocates with examples of pro-
tective laws that harmed women, women worker-oriented groups
81. Hill & Kelley, supra note 2.
82. The NWP established itself as an organization focused solely on equality between the
sexes in significant part through its rejection in 1921 of the concerns as to race, international
peace, and socialist politics presented by delegates, such as Florence Kelley. COTT, THE
GROUNDING OFMODERN FEMINISM, supra note 12, at 68–71.
83. See infra text accompanying note 152.
84. The NWP endorsed laws that extended the same wages, hours, and other limitations
to all workers, but unions at the time believed such comprehensive protections to be politi-
cally infeasible.
85. One particularly acute moment of such tension was when women in the NWP collab-
orated with business interests to produce a Supreme Court brief advancing a liberty of con-
tract theory grounded in the absence of a need by modern women for protective laws, an
argument successfully deployed in support of the invalidation of a minimum wage law in
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
86. FONER, supra note 47, at 339 96.
87. COTT, THEGROUNDING OFMODERN FEMINISM, supra note 12, at 136.
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often responded with proposals to fix each situation one-by-one with
“specific bills for specific ills.”88
Social conventions of male dominance depended on a family
structure that exemplified and perpetuated those norms, and that
family structure, in turn, depended on higher wages for men.89 Un-
ion women were divided among themselves in their allegiance to
the wife-mother model as primary life aspiration and public policy
goal.90 It was generally, and probably correctly, believed that most
women union members wanted a heteronormative home life as well
as better working conditions in paid jobs. Women in union leader-
ship positions navigated these conflicting interests by trying to
avoid the politics of family, the zone in which ERA advocates sought
the greatest change. The inseparability of family and economic sys-
tems rendered this avoidance ultimately impossible for groups af-
filiated both with workers and the ERA.
The unions’ belief that a fair exchange for one’s labor was the
most important issue for all workers produced a gender-neutral
rhetoric that masked a gender-stratified reality. It contained no
understanding of the vestiges of coverture or the gendered nature
of industrial capitalism but was more sensitive to the economic
power relations to which the NWP women paid less attention. The
union approach was more successful than the ERA campaign in
generating a universalist vocabulary, even if at that time there
were many fewer women in the workforce—and certainly in un-
ions—than there were women in marriage.
But even if unions’ rhetorical frame was universalist, their actual
demands perpetuated material effects skewed by gender. A pro-
tected status for women structured wages in a way that buttressed
men’s status as the primary wage earner. Women’s minimum wage
laws amounted to a kind of social pay—wages were set at a level
thought to provide sustenance income for an individual woman.
The family wage—also socially determined—was thought to pro-
vide men with remuneration that could support a wife and children.
Both so-called women’s wages and the family wage represented a
negotiated midpoint between the ideal social policy and a market-
based approach. Neither corresponded (or was meant to) with any
understanding of equality.
88. This phrase persisted in the arguments by ERA opponents for decades. See Equal
Rights Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 75 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 46 (1925); HARRISON, supra note 10, at 39.
89. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 9, 122 (1990).
90. See BECKER, supra note 59, 122 23.
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The ERA campaign continued to shrink, with support for it
drained by the economic crisis of the Depression, the urgency of
World War II, and a postwar surge of suburbanization, until a new
generation of feminists revived it in the early 1970s. By contrast,
the focus on workers and economic citizenship during the New Deal
contributed to a growth of unions, and the war brought a massive
need for more women in the paid workforce. The worker-centered
branch of the women’s rights movement grew in vitality as the ERA
campaign faded.
Throughout this period, the NCL and union women dug into a
“difference,” as opposed to an “equality” politics. Although the jus-
tifications for most selective protections for women essentially died
with the enactment of nationwide minimum wage and maximum
hour laws for men as well as women,91 the NCL and unions contin-
ued to support the categorization of women as workers needing spe-
cial legal protections. Path dependence and lingering internecine
battle wounds among the women’s rights advocates made the posi-
tions difficult to change, as well as the extent to which protective
laws had become popular, for different reasons, among both men
and women workers.
Beyond the specifics of protective laws, the labor unionmovement
provided women with a parallel model of governance—“the work-
place constitution”—and an alternative concept of equality,
grounded in claims for economic citizenship.92 The unions’ concept
of “industrial equality” referred to the achievement of at least a
somewhat level playing field between men and women, secured by
special treatment laws protecting women wage-earners.93 Correla-
tively, unions framed the concept of “industrial liberty” as a nega-
tive liberty shield against government power.94
On this key question of relationship with the state, worker-ori-
ented women’s rights groups, such as the NCL, split with unions.
Unions sought and needed a shield from the state for their institu-
tional existence, to allow them to organize workplaces and bargain
collectively without repression by employers. They also sought
semi-autonomy from government in order to secure social welfare
91. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 219; see DOROTHY SUE COBBLE,
THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN
AMERICA 96 (2004); STORRS, supra note 33, at 177 79.
92. See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL
TO THENEW RIGHT (2014).
93. WOLOCH, supra note 35, at 131, 134; Sybil Lipshultz, Social Feminism and Legal
Discourse: 1908–1923, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 158 (1989).
94. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABORMOVEMENT 7
(1991).
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type benefits through collective bargaining, so that workers would
depend on their unions, rather than on government, for important
benefits. Unions sought to provide both economic power and self-
governance for workers, reflecting a rough calculation that union-
management negotiations would determine male wages, while gov-
ernment could set minimums for women’s jobs that men did not
want.95 The NCL, by contrast, adopted a much more cooperative
attitude toward the state and called on government to furnish social
insurance-type benefit programs regardless of the nature of the in-
dividual’s relationship to the workplace.
Concretely, this philosophical difference facilitated the develop-
ment of an institutional capacity for rights advocacy that distin-
guished women workers’ rights groups from the other two branches
of feminism. The collaboration among worker-centered women’s
rights advocates inside and outside unions led to the establishment
of an ongoing institution within government that was essentially
the voice of women in labor. It also facilitated the development of
a pipeline of progressive feminists who led it and other social insur-
ance-oriented agencies for decades. That new institution was the
Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor, which opened in 1920
as an outgrowth of the influx of women into the non-domestic work-
force during World War I. The Women’s Bureau became the pre-
eminent center for research on the status of American women work-
ers. It was able to draw on resources for advancing the interests of
women workers that the non-governmental groups did not have. It
specialized in investigations of working conditions, data collection,
and publication and dissemination of those findings.96 Its Labor
Advisory Committee functioned as a law and policy think tank for
women’s economic citizenship issues.97
The new pipeline that the Women’s Bureau enabled was the
steady migration of women leaders from workplace-related posi-
tions into the New Deal. Many women who worked in some capac-
ity with the Women’s Bureau during the 1920s later flowed into
New Deal policymaking positions and helped to cement the role of
social insurance in American policy and politics.98 In terms of build-
ing movement capacity and sustainability, the instantiation of
95. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 83 (2001).
96. Arianne Renan Barzilay,Women at Work: Towards an Inclusive Narrative of the Rise
of the Regulatory State, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 170, 194–96 (2008).
97. COBBLE, supra note 91, at 52.
98. WOLOCH, supra note 35, at 154.
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feminist perspectives through the Women’s Bureau in the Depart-
ment of Labor paid countless dividends.
C. The Women’s Movement for Sexual Autonomy
The third component of women’s rights advocacy—the birth con-
trol movement—provides another distinctive example of how advo-
cates used the mechanisms of the legal system in conjunction with
a rights-oriented social movement. It was by far the most successful
branch in the arena of litigation, an achievement likely attributable
at least in part to its frequent positioning as defendants in criminal
prosecutions rather than as plaintiffs in constitutional challenges,
and to the benefits of using free speech arguments rather than
pressing rights explicitly grounded in gender specifically or equality
more generally. The political message that emerged from birth con-
trol advocacy was at once anti-statist, liberal, and feminist, with
each of these themes dominating at particular points in time.
The demand for birth control can be traced to what the authors
of the Seneca Falls Declaration and other early feminists described
as a right to self-sovereignty. Emma Goldman reframed self-sover-
eignty as grounded in a left anarchist ideology of personal free-
dom.99 Margaret Sanger began with a leftist political analysis, ori-
ented to workers’ rights groups, and went on to build a social move-
ment centered on the needs of women that added dimensions of
health and sexual autonomy to citizenship and economic justice is-
sues.100 Sanger developed a political framework that appealed to
bohemians, medical professionals, wealthy liberals, and eugenicists
as well as to women concerned with gender equality. Over time,
her arguments grew more conservative, initially having been
grounded in sexual freedom and public health frameworks, and
later including anti-immigrant and racist themes as well.101
The legal architecture for suppression of birth control infor-
mation and devices lay in federal and state statutes that defined
such materials as categorically obscene.102 Birth control advocates
99. LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 215–
17 (1990); DAVID M. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET
SANGER 10–12, 74 (1970).
100. GORDON, supra note 99, at 203–04, 217–18, 227; KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 15–17.
101. GORDON, supra note 99, at 222–26, 239–40, 245–47; KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 107.
102. In 1873, Congress enacted a law, known colloquially as the Comstock Act, that crim-
inalized “obscene literature and articles of immoral use.” It prohibited use of the mails to
transmit contraceptives and information about contraception. Comstock Act of 1873, ch. 238,
17 Stat. 598. A number of states enacted copycat laws. Alvah W. Sulloway, The Legal and
Political Aspects of Population Control in the United States, 25 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 593,
600 (1960).
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pursued two strategies: statutory repeal and challenges in court.
The group using the first approach, led by Mary Ware Dennett,
made no headway against legislators who would not publicly criti-
cize the suppression of behavior commonly considered to be sexually
immoral.103 The second, pursued by Sanger, successfully used liti-
gation in increasingly sophisticated ways.104
The first phase of birth control litigation grew out of Sanger’s
prosecution for violation of the New York state obscenity statute
after she opened the first American birth control clinic in 1916. Her
lawyer, Jonah Goldstein, offered the constitutional argument that
the prohibition of birth control access denied women the right to
enjoy sexual relations without fear, in violation of liberty rights. In
addition, in a variation on the Brandeis-Goldmark brief’s use of so-
cial facts, he sought to introduce the testimony of physicians and
women who had used Sanger’s clinic to demonstrate the physical
and emotional effects of unwanted pregnancy.105
Neither the trial judge nor the appellate court took the constitu-
tional argument seriously, but the latter reinterpreted the statute
in a way that transformed the legal dynamics of the birth control
movement. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that birth control
information and services for women could fall within the disease
prevention exception to prosecution on the theory that pregnancy
by itself (i.e., without sexually transmitted infection) could consti-
tute a disease.106 Even though limited to doctors, the new interpre-
tation of the obscenity statute opened the space for women’s access
to birth control to become a reality.
Thus, the keystone to the first phase of birth control rights was
replacement of sexual radicalism by deference to medical authority.
The judiciary granted physicians the power to provide birth control
without fear of prosecution, while also not necessarily upsetting the
culture of shame associated with women seeking to have sex with-
out risk of pregnancy. The medical deference model aligned as well
with other early twentieth-century trends: toward greater profes-
sionalization of medicine and the concentration of power under the
control of formally trained doctors.107
103. KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 76–77, 94, 221–24.
104. GORDON, supra note 99, at 292; KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 226–40.
105. ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 152–53, 157 (1992). Goldstein’s brief on appeal cited Muller v. Ore-
gon. Id. at 529 n.6.
106. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637 (N.Y. 1918).
107. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE:
THERISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THEMAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 79–144 (1984).
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The New York decision also brought into focus a third method for
eliminating repressive statutes: not by repeal or by invalidation on
constitutional grounds but by reinterpretation of statutory text. By
construing statutory language, a court leaves open the possibility
that the outcome of its ruling may be effectively overruled by the
legislature to mandate a different interpretation of statutory text,
thus making the judicial decision less binding and less normatively
weighty. At the same time, such a decision establishes a new status
quo: legislators who were willing to accept the new meaning, but
not willing to go on record by voting to change the old meaning, had
the perfect solution; they could do nothing.
And on the surface, nothing was precisely what happened after
the Sanger decision, not only in the New York legislature but in
state legislatures around the country. By the late 1930s, birth con-
trol advocates claimed that physicians in forty states were “free to
act in the field of contraception.”108 In virtually every state, how-
ever, the rule of law was actually more a gentlemen’s agreement of
silence.109 As a result, by 1930, fifty-five clinics had opened in
twelve states.110 By 1944, approximately 800 contraceptive service
providers existed, located in Planned Parenthood and other non-
profit clinics, public health agencies, and hospitals.111
With doctors shielded from criminal liability, advocates under-
took the second phase of birth control litigation as an attempt to
create a uniform national rule and to bring more pressure on phy-
sicians to provide their patients with access to contraceptives.112 On
the surface, it addressed a supply-side problem: even if prescribed
by doctors, some devices were not available for legal purchase be-
cause of restrictions on use of the mail. In the early 1930s, federal
courts had ruled that the government could bar condoms from the
mail only if prosecutors demonstrated that their intended use was
only for contraception and not disease prevention, an impossible
burden of proof, which effectively barred restrictions on shipments
of condoms.113 But devices that women could use on their own re-
mained at risk of confiscation.
108. Frederick A. Ballard et al., Contraceptive Advice, Devices and Preparations, 108
[J]AMA 1819, 1820 (1937).
109. Harriet F. Pilpel & Abraham Stone, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception,
22 N.C. L. REV. 212, 220 (1944) (“only one of these laws has ever been changed”).
110. GORDON, supra note 99, at 266.
111. Pilpel & Stone, supra note 109, at 215–16.
112. See KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 240–50.
113. Davis v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933); Youngs Rubber Corp., Inc. v. C.I.
Lee & Co., Inc., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930).
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By this point, Goldstein had become a judge, and Sanger sought
the assistance of Morris Ernst, the ACLU general counsel who had
begun to build a reputation for winning acquittals in obscenity pros-
ecutions.114 He had successfully defended two birth control advo-
cates, one indicted for violation of the Comstock Act for sending in-
formation through the mail115 and the other prosecuted under the
Tariff Act for materials imported into the U.S.116 In each, Ernst
relied on extensive expert testimony as to the characteristics and
social value of the information, and in each, the court rejected a
First Amendment challenge to the suppression of speech but inter-
preted the statute to rule that the material in question did not fall
within its definition of obscenity. The strategy culminated in what
became Ernst’s most famous case: the 1934 ruling that James
Joyce’s Ulysses could not be barred from the country on the ground
that it was obscene.117
Sanger and Ernst developed a test case for birth control law that
combined the doctor’s only defense with a statutory argument that
contraceptive devices, as well as information, fell outside the scope
of federal obscenity law.118 They facilitated prosecution in the
case—United States v. One Package—by ensuring that federal au-
thorities would seize a shipment of Japanese diaphragms that were
in transit to Dr. Hannah Stone, head of the Sanger-affiliated Birth
Control Research Bureau in New York. Again relying on physician
testimony, Ernst won a ruling from the Second Circuit that the pro-
hibition of obscenity in the Tariff Act did not apply to “things which
might intelligently be employed by conscientious and competent
physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the wellbeing
of their patients.”119
The Solicitor General declined to seek Supreme Court review,
leaving the Second Circuit decision governing imports through New
York, the nation’s largest port of entry. Taking their cue from the
Department of Justice decision not to appeal the Tariff Act case,
federal prosecutors stopped prosecutions under the Comstock Act
as well since both statutes used the term “obscene.”120 One Package
114. Alden Whitman,Morris Ernst, ‘Ulysses’ Case Lawyer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1976
at 40.
115. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
116. United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled “Married Love,” 48 F.2d 821 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); United States v. One Book Entitled “Contraception,” by Marie C. Stopes, 51 F.2d 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1931).
117. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934).
118. CHESLER, supra note 105, at 331–73; KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 248–50.
119. United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1936).
120. Ballard et al., supra note 108, at 1819–20.
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thus effectively eliminated enforcement of federal obscenity laws
against birth control providers.
One Package also strengthened the gentlemen’s agreement that
grew of the Sanger decision in New York.121 There were, however,
two exceptions. Pushback came in Massachusetts and Connecticut,
where state courts rejected the statutory interpretation strategy—
both the “doctors only” exception and construction of the meaning
of “obscene.”122 By World War II, these were the only two states
where prosecutions for birth control materials or information con-
tinued.123
Of the three branches of the women’s rights movement, birth con-
trol advocates—both the (mostly women) leaders and the (mostly
male) lawyers—were the least constrained in their framing of the
issues, which one might characterize as highly adaptive or, less be-
nignly, relentlessly opportunistic. The movement’s incremental-
istic litigation efforts were far more successful than its legislative
campaigns. In particular, the “doctors only” strategy served several
functions simultaneously, illustrating how the structure of legal ar-
gument can shape broadly cultural as well as narrowly legal ideas.
In addition to its doctrinal impact, the “doctors only” argument cre-
ated a new narrative in which professional, male authorities as-
serted scientific bases for their defense of innocent women facing
physical harm; and it provided a rhetoric of reassurance that a de-
pendable male institution would protect society against uncon-
strained female immorality.
D. Summary
Women’s rights advocacy in the years immediately prior to and
after the Nineteenth Amendment reflected a moment of great flux
in constitutional history and social movement development. The
Reconstruction Amendments had redefined citizenship and equal-
ity but had ducked the question of gender with regard to both, de-
ferring instead to a concept of family as quasi-sovereign and semi-
autonomous with regard to the state. The use of First Amendment
arguments by left-liberal lawyers in other contexts opened up
121. Less than a year after the decision, the American Medical Association voted for the
first time to officially recognize birth control as a legitimate part of medical practice. William
L. Laurence, Birth Control Is Accepted by American Medical Body, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1937
at 1, 26.
122. Pilpel & Stone, supra note 109. Voters in Massachusetts also twice rejected referen-
dum proposals that would have liberalized state law. Id.
123. In 1965, the Supreme Court eventually forced these two states into what had become
the new national consensus. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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avenues for the birth control movement. Overall, women’s rights
advocates developed distinctive positions on the relationship be-
tween gender and law.
The broader context held multiple cross-currents. Suffrage had
so powerfully reshaped the discourse of gender that white women’s
claims to economic citizenship as independent workers and to sex-
ual pleasure as autonomous actors became thinkable. At the same
time, racism so powerfully poisoned political discourse, including
concepts of women’s rights, that broad-based opposition to equality
was strengthened and the naturalization of hierarchy reinforced.
The capacity of Progressives to leverage the power of the state for
social goals waned in the period between the Nineteenth Amend-
ment and the New Deal. As the nation grew more conservative in
the latter part of the 1920s, right wing reaction manifested itself in
the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan124 and enactment of harsh quo-
tas in the 1924 Immigration Act.125
The following chart summarizes the internal dynamics in
women’s rights advocacy after adoption of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment:
124. See generally THOMASR. PEGRAM, ONEHUNDRED PERCENTAMERICAN: THEREBIRTH
ANDDECLINE OF THEKUKLUXKLAN IN THE 1920S (2011).
125. See generally JIA LYNN YANG, ONE MIGHTY AND IRRESISTIBLE TIDE: THE EPIC
STRUGGLE OVER AMERICAN IMMIGRATION, 1924–1965 (2020).
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IV. STATE, FAMILY, MARKET
Equality for women proved much easier to invoke than to define.
If equality remained within the frame of voting and formal political
citizenship, it was possible to imagine, effectuate, and defend.
Equality in the context of family or sexuality, by contrast, fell short
on all three measures. Advocates needed a framework for the the-
ory and praxis of gender equality that applied across the board, but
legal institutions are seldom sufficiently capacious to encompass
such range in a single concept. Nor were women’s rights advocates
able to offer one.
The multiple meanings of women’s equality demonstrate how
contingent the concept of equality is on context and time. The his-
tory of the women’s legal advocacy illustrates that equality is not
one idea that can be applied to different social groups, with minor
variations, as it is interpreted and taught in constitutional law. The
women’s rights movement experience in the early twentieth cen-
tury shows that a melding, even a scrambling, of contradictory ide-
ologies contributes to the popular discourse of equality. Under-
standing it as the linear development of a standardized concept of
equal rights is both erroneous and misleading.
Today, law and a culture of civil rights have condensed equality
into one conceptual mass, which typically manifests in law in two
modalities: legislatively by the enumeration of protected categories
and judicially by official suspicion of certain legislative classifica-
tions. Together, these two devices comprise what I am calling the
civil rights paradigm. Going as far back as Reconstruction, and es-
pecially since civil rights statutes began to appear in significant
numbers after World War II, the chief goal of equality advocates
has been to add new categories and classifications to the list. This
is the version of equality that dominates the legal system, major
institutions, market actors, and popular understanding.
Women’s rights organizations, however, lacked the essential in-
gredients to draw on that conceptual universe. There was neither
a working and workable shared definition of gender equality nor
was there widespread legibility of women as a “minority,” i.e., a po-
litical and social group that was defined by its legal status.126
126. I am using the term “minority” to include both an internal and external dimension.
The internal, subjective dimension refers to a group of persons experiencing a sense of “we-
ness” typical of civil rights constituencies. The external dimension refers to the understood
similarity among members of the group, including a socially constructed or accepted pattern
of unequal treatment. See generally Helen Mayer Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30
SOC. FORCES 60 (1951) (one of the first applications in sociological literature of the term “mi-
nority” to women).
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The Supreme Court accepted the legitimacy of using judicial
power to invalidate majoritarian legislation in 1938 in the famous
Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,127 by ac-
knowledging the democracy deficit that attaches to minorities.
Women, however, did not comfortably fit the Carolene Products
analysis because they are not a numerical minority, and despite the
ongoing campaign for equal rights under law for women that fol-
lowed the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, they
were not considered analogous to the categories of race or religion
for purposes of the first antidiscrimination statutes. Today, women
are often subsumed in a social and cultural category of “minority”
in popular discussion.
If one re-imagines women’s equality as a claim for justice on be-
half of a numerically large group united more by its subordinate
relationship to power structures than by any shared characteristics,
economic class might have been the better analogy. That specula-
tion has to remain counterfactual, however, because the bulk of the
labor movement at that time did not welcome women as equal com-
rades. One can imagine that this shift in analogy might have
opened up the concept of legal equality for women to deeper under-
standings of the role of economic status in equality under law. But
neither constitutional discourse, with its heritage of the Recon-
struction Amendments excluding women as a class and its Carolene
Products emphasis on minorities unable to engage in pluralist bar-
gaining, nor the labor movement, with its concept of equality as ex-
ogenous to the state, made such a possibility even thinkable.
Strategically and conceptually, the divergence between the three
branches of feminism rendered the articulation of equality as a
master frame for women’s rights impossible during this period. The
ERA and worker-focused branches demonstrated the shortfalls of
addressing one side of the iron triangle—the state-family or the
state-economy side—without tackling the others. Operating on a
parallel doctrinal track, but without addressing equality head-on,
the birth control movement more successfully engaged the family-
market axis but only by relying on medical authority.
In movement organizational terms, each major component of
women’s rights advocacy had a comparative advantage. The NWP
proposed to eliminate discriminatory state laws with a constitu-
tional amendment, building on its track record of winning the Nine-
teenth Amendment; unions brought their knowledge and skills in
confronting the power of capital; worker-focused women’s groups,
127. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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such as NCL, expertly navigated positions of power within the
state; and the birth control movement, largely through the ACLU
and its affiliated lawyers, brought its growing ability to make suc-
cessful constitutional arguments in the courts. But the multiple
comparative advantages together created a huge minus: the inabil-
ity to make a coherent legal equality argument for a unified concept
of women’s rights across issues and zones of political, economic, and
social life.
V. BRIDGEDISCOURSES
In 1920, when victorious suffragists celebrated the Nineteenth
Amendment, and confidently turned to their next project, the rela-
tive power of the three components of women’s rights advocacy
movements had already begun to shift away from them. Campaign-
ers for the ERA continued during the 1930s and 1940s to battle
NCL and other feminists, but support and enthusiasm for the ERA
at the grassroots level ebbed. The ascent of women workers’ con-
cerns followed the increasing power of the New Deal and the labor
movement. The birth control movement, just beginning in 1920,
grew in power and influence as liberal First Amendment arguments
were used to defeat restrictive contraception and obscenity laws but
did not directly challenge the other two branches as to conceptuali-
zations of equality.
Beneath the surface, even as the returning male veterans of
World War II took or took back the well-paid industrial jobs that
women had performed during the war, an even more important and
longer lasting shift was occurring. After the loss of jobs in the im-
mediate postwar period, the number and percentage of women
working outside the home increased during the 1950s.128 By 1960,
key demographic indicators had reversed: marriage rates fell, the
average age at marriage increased, the fertility rate began to de-
cline, and the divorce rate was growing.129
A. Seeds of the Civil Rights Paradigm
The unprecedented numbers of women who came into the civilian
workforce during World War II, many doing what had been consid-
ered to be men’s jobs, brought the demand for equal pay into new
128. EUGENIAKALEDIN, MOTHERS ANDMORE: IN THE 1950S, at 64 (1984).
129. ELAINE TYLERMAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLDWAR ERA
221 (1988); STEVENMINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 203 (1988).
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prominence for the worker-focused women’s rights advocates.130 At
the same time, racial justice advocates were developing the model
for statutory civil rights law. The anti-discrimination paradigm in
federal law initially emerged in pre-war Department of Interior reg-
ulations developed by Robert Weaver and Harold Ickes.131 Its first
prominent use came in an Executive Order against discrimination
based on race (but not sex) in war-related industries, which estab-
lished a Fair Employment Practices Commission charged with en-
forcing the Executive Order.132 New York enacted the first
statewide statute providing comprehensive anti-discrimination
protection in the workplace based on enumerated protected charac-
teristics in 1945, also covering race but not sex.133
Women in unions began to incorporate and adapt the civil rights
approach. Ironically, this brought them substantively closer to the
anti-classification position associated with the equality/sameness
understanding advocated by the ERA supporters who opposed pro-
tective workplace laws for women. But although ERA advocates
and women worker groups fought each other for decades over pro-
tective employment laws, the two camps had always agreed on the
principle of equal pay for equal work. In normal times, the sex seg-
regation of the workforce rendered this issue largely irrelevant:
men and women rarely did the same jobs. Only with the emergency
conditions of women performing “men’s jobs” during wartime did
the principle of equal pay acquire practical and political im-
portance.134
The opposing camps within the women’s rights movement had
argued not only over what “equality” meant, but also, correlatively,
130. Earlier, during the relatively short life of the National Recovery Administration,
NCL (and NWP) had fought against the sex-based wage differentials that were built into the
NRA codes at the beginning of Roosevelt’s first term. STORRS, supra note 30, at 108. Once
the codes, although discriminatory, were adopted, NCL organized workers to demand their
enforcement and supported enactment by state legislatures of what were effectively mini-
mum wage laws intended as a response to the economic emergency. COBBLE, supra note 91,
at 112–13, 115–19, 121–22. This effort cemented both equality and difference women’s rights
advocates as sharing the same position as to unequal pay and also placed them in alliance
with the efforts by the NAACP to stop race differentials in the same codes.
131. See generally JILL WATTS, THE BLACK CABINET: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS ANDPOLITICSDURING THEAGEOFROOSEVELT (2020); Walter B. Hill, Jr., Finding
a Place for the Negro: Robert C. Weaver and the Groundwork for the Civil Rights Movement,
PROLOGUE, Spring 2005, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/spring/wea
ver.html.
132. Exec. Order 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941).
133. Pauli Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 388,
420 (1945).
134. Equal pay legislation was first introduced in Congress in 1945. COBBLE, supra note
91, at 51–52.
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what constituted “discrimination.”135 Among union women, refer-
ences to “discrimination” increased beginning in the 1940s in the
context of women’s war work, and gradually expanded in scope as
some women began to see the old protectionist laws in that light.136
In the late 1930s, the National Labor Relations Board began to deny
requests by unions or employers to certify collective bargaining
units that excluded women workers.137 In 1942, two unions suc-
cessfully brought General Motors (GM) before the National War La-
bor Board over its policy of paying women less than men for doing
what had been men’s jobs.138 The GM suit led to the Board’s prom-
ulgation of General Order 16 that endorsed equalization of male
and female wage rates but made compliance voluntary.139 Other
Board decisions involving sex discrimination addressed issues of
pay and seniority.140
State laws banning job discrimination based on race were enacted
beginning in 1920 in Massachusetts and New Jersey, initially cov-
ering only specific categories of public sector jobs.141 By 1945, four-
teen states had at least one such law, amounting to thirty-eight en-
actments in all, nearly half of which were adopted during World
War II.142 Of the thirty-eight provisions, three included sex discrim-
ination.143 In addition, Michigan enacted a separate equal pay law
for women.144 By the end of 1945, three other states had followed
New York in enacting comprehensive anti-discrimination laws;145
one, New Jersey, included sex as a prohibited classification.146 Be-
tween 1945 and 1964, only one other state adopted a law that in-
cluded protection from sex discrimination.147 Male union leaders
often supported these laws on the ground that they would prevent
employers from lowering the pay assigned to the jobs that men were
expected to have when the war ended, and the War Labor Board
135. Id. at 62–65.
136. Id. at 88–92, 98–99.
137. Murray, supra note 133, at 398.
138. FONER, supra note 47, at 357.
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justified its endorsement of the equal pay principle as necessary for
the maximum utilization of “manpower.”148 Problems in enforce-
ment, however, exacerbated the spotty coverage and limited the
laws’ effects.149
After the war, sex segregation returned in force and stymied the
campaign for equal pay. Employers refused to give up the cheap
labor pool of women workers by setting pay based on the skill levels
associated with the job. The expanded campaign to increase the
pay for women and for women’s jobs offered the opportunity for rap-
prochement between the two sides that had fought so many intra-
movement battles. Pursuing common ground gradually became
easier as a new generation of leaders took over the feuding organi-
zations. Forty years after a failed attempt to coalesce the branches
of the women’s rights movement immediately after suffrage,150
women from the various wings of the movement tried again and
succeeded.
B. Truce
The institutional mechanism for integrating women into the civil
rights paradigm was the President’s Commission on the Status of
Women (PCSW), “the first effort on the part of the Federal govern-
ment to address the question of women in American society” in a
comprehensive way.151 Created by President Kennedy in 1961, the
PCSW was led by Esther Peterson, whom President Kennedy ap-
pointed as Director of the Women’s Bureau after she had worked as
a lobbyist at the AFL-CIO. Peterson’s selection to lead the PCSW
made her the highest-ranking federal official until that time to have
an explicit women’s rights portfolio in national politics.
Tensions that had never fully healed from the split between the
ERA equal treatment wing and the protective labor laws difference
wing initially dogged the members of the Commission. They were
unable to agree on whether to endorse the ERA, and instead
adopted a compromise position that the ERA “need not now be
sought” because properly interpreted, the Fourteenth Amendment
would bar discrimination.152 Very little of the Commission report
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addressed issues of race. In the end, it was organized modestly into
goals and steps. Its only immediate concrete product was President
Kennedy’s issuance of a directive ending sex discrimination in fed-
eral jobs.153
But the Commission was nonetheless a turning point for women’s
rights. Although punting on the ERA, the Commission endorsed
Pauli Murray’s pathbreaking analysis under which sex was formu-
lated as a minority-like classification entitled to coverage under the
Equal Protection Clause. Inclusion as a protected characteristic in
civil rights statutes proceeded on the same logic.154 Murray’s work
on the Commission led to both the foundational law review article
making this argument155 and a memorandum to Congress that
proved decisive in coverage of sex under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.156
The analogy of sex to race has become the dominant analytic
mode throughout civil rights law with regard to gender equality. Its
adoption by women’s rights advocates during the deliberations of
the Commission and its acceptance by Congress during debates
over the 1964 Civil Rights Act presaged the extension of that un-
derstanding of equality rights to other socially disfavored groups as
well.
C. Childcare: The Missing Link
At Women’s Bureau conferences in 1945 and 1946, delegates ex-
pressed the desire that ending discrimination against women work-
ers be done in such a way as not to penalize women for mother-
hood.157 Overcoming the last link in the iron triangle, that connect-
ing family and the economy, has proven to be an insuperable polit-
ical barrier for every wave of the women’s movement. The difficulty
in securing reasonably priced child care is its most acute contempo-
rary manifestation.
There is a long history of efforts to reallocate the burdens of child-
care from individual families to collective entities.158 Like many of
the organizations discussed in this article, the leading actors have
been women leading groups with a membership largely composed
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of women. But childcare is an economic issue that does not fit into
the wages and hours paradigm. As a result, the social insurance
principle—in this context, treating the family as the economic en-
tity that it is—is rarely characterized as an essential part of the
civil rights paradigm. After President Nixon’s veto of a childcare
bill in 1971, its proponents were unable to revive it enough to secure
enactment.159
VI. CONCLUSION
Contestation over the meaning of equality, within the framework
of law, had a profound impact on women’s rights. It helps explain
why a movement led by white women, and thus doubly majoritar-
ian, could not plausibly invoke majoritarian rhetoric in support of
its demands and instead adopted the social position of minority.
Analysis of social movement-based arguments also helps us under-
stand the structural implications of the law’s creation and fostering
of the quasi-sovereignty of family law; its regulation of the labor
pool; and the resistance to incorporation of social insurance princi-
ples in the understanding of equality. These issues have produced
unique challenges for women’s rights movements seeking to take
advantage of a master frame of equality that could align with legal
discourse.
Then Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote in 1938 that:
[t]he legal position of woman cannot be stated in a single, sim-
ple formula, because her life cannot be expressed in a single,
simple relation. . . . The law must have regard for woman in
her manifold relations as an individual, as a wage-earner, as a
wife, as a mother, as a citizen.160
It is ironic, but more than coincidental, that Frankfurter’s essay
appeared in the same year that Carolene Products was decided; it
resonates with the Supreme Court’s assumption that women did
not belong in a list of groups marked most indelibly by lack of polit-
ical power. To Frankfurter and the Court, what we recognize today
as the many forces that produce the social construction of woman
rendered her illegible as a coherent legal subject apart from her so-
cial, especially family, roles.
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Between the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment and the in-
clusion of women in anti-discrimination laws—between suffrage
and civil rights—women’s advocates sought to bend both the mean-
ing and the law of equality into a principle that was expansive
enough to encompass the reality of all dimensions of women’s lives.
That effort continues.
